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Abstract 
 
Against a backdrop of serious corporate and mutual fund scandals, governmental bodies, 
institutional and private investors have demanded more effective corporate governance structures 
procedures and systems. The compliance function is now an integral part of corporate policy and 
practice. This paper presents the findings from a longitudinal qualitative research study on the 
introduction of an IT-based investment management system at four client sites. Using institutional 
theory to analyze our data, we find the process of institutionalization follows a non-linear pathway 
where regulative, normative and cultural forces within the investment management industry 
produce conflicting organizational behaviours and outcomes.  
 
Keywords: Corporate and IT governance, institutional theory, compliance, investment 
management 
 
Résumé en français 
Les autorités de tutelle ainsi que les investisseurs institutionnels ou privés demandent maintenant 
des structures, des procédures et des systèmes de gouvernance qui soient efficaces pour garantir 
la conformité au sein des firmes financières. Ce papier présente les résultats d’une étude 
qualitative longitudinale sur l’introduction d’un système informatisé de gestion des 
investissements sur quatre sites clients. Mobilisant la théorie institutionnelle pour analyser nos 
données, nous trouvons que le processus d’institutionnalisation suit un chemin non linéaire où les 
forces régulatrices, normatives et culturelles à l’intérieur du secteur de la gestion des 
investissements produisent des résultats et des comportements organisationnels conflictuels.  
 
Introduction 
 
Serious financial scandals in recent years have undermined the confidence of both institutional and individual 
investors and raised important questions about how enterprises can improve measures and place controls to protect 
their stakeholders. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was developed to strengthen internal checks and balances 
to improve corporate governance and accountability. An important distinction is that senior management and 
business process owners are not only required to establish an adequate internal control structure, but also to assess its 
effectiveness on an annual basis (ITGI 2004). Since information systems, corporate databases and IT infrastructure 
components are essential for producing accurate, reliable and timely information for the internal control and 
reporting processes of firms, the role of IT in corporate governance is critical. The changing regulatory and legal 
framework governing the financial sector thus places further responsibility and accountability on senior executives 
and IT professionals to comply with the requirements of SOX (PCAOB 2004) and other systems. 
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Prior work has sought to investigate IT-enabled governance structures (Chin et al. 2004; Meyer 2004; Weill and 
Ross 2005), IT capabilities and network architectures (Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999) and financial evaluation 
procedures and processes (Bodnar 2003). Yet few studies have sought to develop a multi-level theoretical 
understanding of how regulative and legal pressures impose new challenges on firms to adopt IT as a compliance 
mechanism as part of their internal governance structures, and how groups and individuals come to accept or resist 
these pressures. Recognizing that most research on formal and informal IT-enabled governance structures adopts a 
single unit of analysis (e.g. society, organization, business function, or group/individual) this study was interested to 
observe how regulatory bodies and professional organizations impose new governance rules and procedures on 
firms, and on how this changes organizational and group behaviours. In particular, we were interested to track how 
increasing regulation brought about by financial scandals was changing governance structures where the compliance 
function was becoming an integral part of senior management responsibility. 
 
In this study, we embraced institutional theory to analyse our data. We observe the institutionalization of the IT 
compliance function across four organizations in the investment management industry where automated compliance 
checks have become mission critical activities. We adopt a longitudinal research method that tracks these firms over 
a six-year period. Institutional theorists view organizations as governance structures by observing regulatory, 
normative and cultural-cognitive processes of institutionalization (Scott, 2008). While institutionalized 
organizational behaviours have been viewed as stable, repetitive and enduring activities (Zucker 1991) little attention 
has been given to the processes of institutional change or deinstitutionalization, which is the erosion or discontinuity 
of an institutionalized organizational activity or practice (Oliver 1992). Much research in institutional theory has 
measured the outcome ‘effects’ while assuming the ‘process’ (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). The research presented in 
this paper, thus attempts to offer some insights on how the societal, organizational and behavioural factors influence 
the compliance function following the introduction of an investment management system. In particular, observing 
the processes of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization.  
 
The remaining paper is divided into five sections. First, we introduce the relevant corporate and IT governance 
literature and suggest the need for more process-oriented studies. Second, we develop the theoretical framework that 
adopts three levels of analysis to study IT governance. This framework draws on concepts from institutional theory 
and focuses upon the IT compliance function. Third, we discuss the methods of data collection and introduce the 
case material. Fourth, we discuss the findings. Finally, we present our conclusions by suggesting new research 
directions.   
 
The Compliance Function  
 
The literature on corporate governance is multi-disciplinary and embraces societal, organizational and individual 
dimensions. At the societal level, governance focuses upon the legal and regulatory frameworks developed and 
imposed by regulatory bodies as well as on the societal impact. At the organizational field level, it encapsulates the 
organizational structures, processes and practices within and across individual firms. Societal, commercial and 
technical changes impact this level and may even transform an industry (Barrett and Walsham 1999). At the 
individual level, governance usually focuses on the ethical corporate behaviour of executives responsible for the 
creation of wealth for shareholders (Roussey, 2003). In this study, we consider each of these levels to be critical for 
gaining an understanding of how governance structures, processes and practices become institutionalized over time.  
 
In the information systems literature, the concept of governance has gained popularity in recent years. It offers a 
range of studies on a variety of topics, yet few reveal optimal corporate and IT governance arrangements. A recent 
study offers six governance archetypes (business or IT monarchy, feudal, duopoly, federal, or anarchy) that support 
each of the five key IT decisions (IT principles, infrastructure, architecture, business application needs, and 
investment) (Weill and Ross 2005). This work provides a useful template for evaluating the contribution of IT 
towards overall business performance. Other studies have looked at how governance structures change as a 
consequence of mergers and acquisitions (Chin et al. 2004); the role of top management in designing IT governance 
procedures, policies and processes (Lainhart 2000; Meyer 2004; Peterson 2004); IT governance arrangements 
(Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999); hybrid IS governance solutions (Brown 1997); and IT and transformation 
(Hvalshagen 2004); and organizational readiness and stakeholder participation (Rau 2004). However, the majority of 
studies have not linked societal, organizational and individual dimensions to IT governance as they tend to look at 
unitary levels of analysis. This study augments this literature base by tracking how regulative and legal systems exert 
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pressures on firms and individuals to change IT governance systems. The organizational context is the compliance 
function, which is central to how firms address new rule-based regulatory and legal frameworks.  
 
In recent years, the introduction of government regulation, particularly the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has 
exerted significant pressure on firms to improve corporate responsibility and restore investor confidence in public 
markets. SOX and supporting regulations have revised the rules for accountability, disclosure and reporting, stressing 
that effective governance is synonymous with ethical business practice. One aim is to strengthen internal checks and 
balances and improve corporate accountability through effective governance measures. There are three relevant 
sections to IT in the SOX legislation: 1) - 404, which requires officers to attest to the effectiveness of internal 
controls for financial reporting; 2) - 302, which requires officers to sign statements verifying the completeness and 
accuracy of financial statements; and 3) - 409, which requires that ‘material financial events’ be reported in real time. 
In particular, CIOs must enhance their knowledge of internal control, understand and execute the SOX compliance 
plan, develop the compliance function to specifically address IT controls, and integrate this plan into the overall SOX 
compliance plan. These conditions pose significant challenges to the way IT services are deployed and governed. As 
IT is now an integral part of business processes within financial service firms, its role in meeting regulatory 
requirements is critical to the compliance function.  
 
Theoretical Research Framework 
 
Our research model (Figure 1) is developed using an institutionalist perspective. It contains key concepts used within 
institutionalism.  The central theme of institutional theory is how social choices are shaped, mediated, and channelled 
by institutional arrangements (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). An institution is defined as ‘recognised practices 
consisting of easily identifiable roles, coupled with collections of rules or conventions governing relations among the 
occupants of these roles’ (Young 1986, P.107). Institutionalism examines how ‘social processes, obligations, or 
actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action’ (Meyer and Rowan 1991, p.42). It views 
organizational design and structure as a process of external and internal pressures. This leads organizations within an 
organizational field to resemble one another over time; a phenomenon known as institutional isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 1987; Tolbert 1988; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). How 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive processes construct, maintain and diffuse institutions is a main interest 
in institutional theory. Institutionalists’ also observe the processes of change, where institutions become weaker and 
disappear. This is referred to as deinstitutionalization (Oliver 1992).  
 
A perennial theme running through the literature on institutional theory is the notion that actors and their interests are 
institutionally constructed (Jepperson 1991). It emphasizes the rejection of rational-actor or functionalist models of 
organizational change (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Zucker 1988). Institutionalization is viewed as a state-dependent 
process that makes organizations less instrumentally rational by limiting their options (North 1990). The emphasis is 
on the relationship between organizations and their environments, as well as the inconsistencies different 
organizations attach to their formal and informal accounts of reality. More recently, neo-institutionalism draws 
heavily on sociological theory within organizational analysis. It examines how and why action is structured and order 
made possible by shared systems of rules that both enable some groups and individuals to benefit from the prevailing 
rewards and sanctions, while others are constrained, as their interests are not served by the system. By rejecting 
rational-actor models, neo-institutionalism treats institutions as independent variables (Scott 2008). Cognitive and 
cultural explanations are important with less attention given to the consequences of individual behaviour or motives 
in shaping organizational environments. The unit of analysis is usually at the inter-organizational level since 
institutionalization occurs at the sectoral or societal levels. Organizational forms, structural components, and rules, 
rather than specific organizations become institutionalized. However, institutionalists’ advocate a multi-level 
analysis, particularly as individual behaviour reflects institutional effects emanating from societal, field, inter-
organizational and organizational levels (Greenwood et al. 2008).  
 
A perennial theme running through the literature on institutional theory is the notion that actors and their interests are 
institutionally constructed (Jepperson 1991). It emphasizes the rejection of rational-actor or functionalist models of 
organizational change (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Zucker 1988). Institutionalization is viewed as a state-dependent 
process that makes organizations less instrumentally rational by limiting their options (North 1990). The emphasis is 
on the relationship between organizations and their environments, as well as the inconsistencies different 
organizations attach to their formal and informal accounts of reality. More recently, neo-institutionalism draws 
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heavily on sociological theory within organizational analysis. It examines how and why action is structured and order 
made possible by shared systems of rules that both enable some groups and individuals to benefit from the prevailing 
rewards and sanctions, while others are constrained, as their interests are not served by the system. By rejecting 
rational-actor models, neo-institutionalism treats institutions as independent variables (Scott 2008). Cognitive and 
cultural explanations are important with less attention given to the consequences of individual behaviour or motives 
in shaping organizational environments. The unit of analysis is usually at the inter-organizational level since 
institutionalization occurs at the sectoral or societal levels. Organizational forms, structural components, and rules, 
rather than specific organizations become institutionalized. However, institutionalists’ advocate a multi-level 
analysis, particularly as individual behaviour reflects institutional effects emanating from societal, field, inter-
organizational and organizational levels (Greenwood et al. 2008). 
 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Research Framework 
 
Whereas early work on institutionalism viewed organizations as organic wholes, neo- institutionalism perceives them 
as ‘loosely coupled arrays of standardized elements’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, p.14) and emphasises the 
homogeneity of organizations and the relative stability of institutionalized components (Zucker 1991). 
Institutionalization is viewed as both a phenomenological process where social relationships and actions come to be 
taken for granted, and a state of affairs in which shared cognitions determine what actions are possible and what has 
meaning (Zucker 1983). Neo institutionalism confines irrationality to the formal structure rather than the level of the 
organization or individual. Thus, it attributes the ‘diffusion of departments and operating procedures to inter-
organizational influences, conformity, and the persuasiveness of cultural accounts, rather than to the functions they 
are intended to perform’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, p.13). These institutional theories provide the foundation for 
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our theoretical research framework (Figure 1). This framework is used to analyse our data on the IT compliance 
function.  
 
Research in institutional theory considers either the ‘effects’ or ‘processes’ of institutionalization. The former often 
uses a variance approach which views institutions as entities by examining their characteristics, which are delineated 
as abstract dependent or independent variables (Mohr 1982). Researchers attempt to determine the causal 
relationships between the variables. This approach identifies the factors associated with the observed characteristics, 
yet places less attention on the time ordering between the precursor and outcome variables (Scott 2008). Conversely, 
a process approach looks at ‘a series of occurrences of events rather than a set of relations among variables’ (Mohr 
1982, p.54). The time ordering of important and relevant events, often reported as occurring sequentially in real time, 
is critical to process oriented research (Langlois 1986, p.7). For this study, we use a process-oriented approach, as we 
are interested to observe the implementation of a compliance system over an extended period of time. The ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions in relation to a contemporary phenomenon within a complex organization suggests that a 
longitudinal case-based method is more appropriate (Teo et al. 2003). While this study generated voluminous data 
sets, this short paper reports the findings from the following research question: 1) How do regulatory and legal 
pressures on the compliance function in investment management firms change institutionalized practices? 
 
Research Methodology 
 
A qualitative research methodology was developed to investigate the implementation of a compliance system from a 
single independent software vendor (ISV) at four independent client sites. The primary reason for introducing the 
technology was to comply with stringent compliance regulations governing the financial services industry. Table 1 
shows the demographics and study relevant contextual information about the four client sites. The ISV is a market-
leading provider of software and services to investment managers in the global mutual fund, banking, pension, hedge 
fund, wealth management and insurance sectors. It also offers software consulting and application engineering. By 
combining state-of-the-art and industry-standard technologies, the firm delivers applications that are open, flexible, 
scalable, rich in functionality, and easy-to-use. Founded in the early 1980s and privately held, the firm serves some 
145 clients worldwide representing over US$10 trillion in assets. The extensive methodology, relational database and 
applications development experience acquired in the company’s early years became the foundation for the design 
and development of firm’s current product line. Currently, the firm dedicates its resources solely to the development 
and support of its investment management and products and services, specifically the Investment Management 
System (IMS). 
 
The IMS is a comprehensive front- and middle-office software suite for all security types. From advanced ‘what if’ 
analysis and order creation to electronic execution and settlement connectivity, the IMS streamlines workflow to 
shorten trade cycles and increase operational efficiencies. Each of the suite’s three components is available as a 
standalone application. The first offers sophisticated tools for portfolio management including ‘what if’ analysis, 
modelling, portfolio rebalancing, and order generation. The second provides order management, electronic trading, 
and liquidity access. The third offers global, real-time, pre-trade, post execution and portfolio-level compliance 
monitoring. The IMS supports 24x7 operations and facilitates downstream trade processing via embedded links to 
VMUs, custodians, and settlement facilities. Message-based APIs and exposed Web services allow for rapid systems 
integration. 
 
Table 1: Participant Client Firms 
 Firm C.1 Firm C.2 Firm C.3 Firm C.4 
Age Established Established New (13 yrs old) New (6 yrs old) 
Employees 160  100 100 
Traders 8  0 8 
Fund Managers 120  5  
Accounts under 
Management 
£14bn  £8bn £12bn 
Debt Yes – 10% Yes – 15% Yes – 50% Yes – 60% 
Derivative No No Yes – 20% Yes – 15% 
Currency Yes – 5% Yes – 10% Yes – 30% Yes – 25% 
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Money Mkt Yes – 10% Yes – 15% No No 
Equity Yes – 75% Yes – 60% No No 
Use FIX Yes Yes No No 
Compliance Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of Funds 12,000 9,000 50 20 
Imp. Team Size 9 20 2 9 
Existing System Separate systems for FM 
and Traders that were not 
easily integrated 
Existing OMS that was 
to be replaced 
Excel spread sheets 
and paper based deal 
tickets 
Excel spread sheets 
and paper based deal 
tickets 
Market Corporate pension plans, 
private clients and 
wealthy individuals  
Corporate pension 
plans, private clients 
and wealthy individuals 
Hedge Trading Hedge Trading 
Accounting 
System 
Quasar SimCorp SimCorp Decalog but will 
become Invest1 
Infrastructure Windows 2000, Citrix 
used for connection. All 
Oracle and SQLServer 
database systems in US 
Windows NT, LAN and 
WAN. 
SQL 
Windows XP, LAN 
and WAN. 
SQLServer database 
Windows XP, LAN 
and WAN.  
SQLServer database. 
MSMQ 
In-house skills Expert DBA, network 
teams, 24hr help desk, in-
house training 
Expert DBA, network 
teams, 24hr help desk, 
in-house training 
All outsourced In-house IT skills 
 
 
Data Collection  
 
Data was collected from 2001-2008. Primary data was obtained mainly through the interviews using open-ended and 
semi-structured questionnaire at both client and vendor sites. Additionally, we observed participants at the vendor 
site during the implementation phases. Secondary data included internal sources such as project plans, notes from 
meetings between vendor and client, annual reports, internal documents on technology strategy, newsletters, press 
releases, company websites, brochures, and emails; and external sources such as investment industry reports, 
government publications (e.g. SOX act), trade journals, business and technology web sites, financial press reports, 
and trade fairs. Since the software project implementations were phased across several years, each of the client sites 
were visited at different periods, with some interviewing schedules lasting longer than others. What was important 
was to visit all sites at the beginning and end of the software implementation cycle, although it is recognized that 
regulatory and legal requirements would vary across each firm. Table 2 shows the data collection phases. 
 
Table 2: Data Collection Phases 
Site Interview Schedule Informants No of Interviews  
Firm C.1 Phase 1: January 2001-February 2002 
Phase 2: October 2002-December 2003 
Phase 3: June 2004-August 2004 
Phase 4: December 2005-Jan 2006 
Phase 5: Feb 2007-May 2007 
Chief Information Officer 
Finance Director 
IT Project Managers (3) 
Implementation Manager 
Head of Compliance 
Compliance Officers (3) 
Relationship Manager 
12 persons 
interviewed x 5 
Firm C.2 Phase 1: January 2002-October 2003 
Phase 2: June 2004-August 2004 
Phase 3: May 2005-August 2005 
Phase 4: Jan 2006-March 2006 
Phase 5: October 2007-December 2007 
Chief Information Officer 
Finance Director 
IT Project Managers (3) 
Implementation Managers (2) 
Head of Compliance 
Compliance Officers (3) 
10 persons 
interviewed x 5 
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Firm C.3 Phase 1: March 2004-December 2004 
Phase 2: February 2005-April 2005 
Phase 3: June 2006-July 2006 
Phase 4: March 2007-May 2007 
Phase 5: December 2007-Jan 2008 
Chief Information Officer 
IT Project Manager 
Business Analyst (2) 
Implementation Managers (2) 
Compliance Officers (2) 
8 persons 
interviewed x 5 
Firm C.4 Phase 1: September 2004-January 2005 
Phase 2: February 2005-April 2005 
Phase 3: April 2006-June 2006 
Phase 4: September 2007-October 2007 
Phase 5: January 2008-February 2008 
Chief Information Officer 
IT Project Manager 
Business Analyst 
Implementation Manager 
Compliance Officers (2) 
6 persons 
interviewed 
 
Interviews were carried out at the beginning of the software implementation cycle, during the mid-cycle, and at the 
end, where the project was at the ‘go-live’ stage. This research design and data collection and analysis approach 
enabled the close tracking of each of the four client site implementations of the IMS. The lengthy period of data 
collection also coincided with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which posed further software challenges to the 
introduction of the compliance system. Further regulation was introduced in the form of Markets and Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFiD), which posed additional constraints on firms to alter their business processes and 
practices to comply with new financial services rules and regulations. 
 
Data was collected from multiple informants. An IMS implementation consultant from the vendor organization 
worked across the four client sites. This proved particularly valuable as this individual was able to compare and 
contrast the different IMS project approaches in terms of management style, culture of the organization, governance 
of IT, resource allocation of staff and other resources (hardware, software, external technical support) to the project, 
staff attitudes to government regulation and sanctions, and managerial roles in initiating changes to existing working 
practices. At the client sites, a number of individuals were interviewed: senior executives (CEO, Head of Compliance 
Management, Finance Directors), IS professionals (permanent and contract staff) and non-IS staff (i.e. business 
analysts and marketing managers). Construct validity was therefore obtained by discussing key concepts, constructs 
and terminology with each of the informants and triangulating the findings. Interviews typically lasted between one 
and three hours, and all informants were interviewed at least twice. The interviews were tape-recorded and the tapes 
transcribed. The informants were given the transcript of the interview to enable them to validate the data.  
 
Following the initial phase of data collection at the four client sites in conjunction with an extensive literature review 
on social and organization theory, institutional theory was adopted as a rich theoretical lens for analysing the data. 
Part of the rationale for selecting institutional theory was to address calls made in the literature for more longitudinal, 
process-oriented studies where data is collected over different time-spans to observe how existing organizational 
structures, processes and practices undergo change (Oliver 1992; Swanson and Ramiller 1997). Such changes were 
not adequately explained through individual rational choice, but reflected wider societal and institutional pressures 
on the investment management industry. Institutional theory therefore offered a conceptual framework for analysing 
and understanding the processes of institutionalization of governance structures within a segment of the financial 
sector. Another reason was to utilise institutional theory in response to concerns that coercive forces equate to 
regulatory change in the not-for-profit (public) sector, which is highlighted as a common misunderstanding about 
institutional theory, particularly as coercive, mimetic and normative pressures also exert change in the private sector 
(Hayward and Boeker 1998; Fiss, 2008). 
 
Analysis and Discussion 
 
In this section, we analyse the four IMS implementations drawing using institutional theory as a lens to understand 
the processes of how IT-enabled governance structures become institutionalized. The value of this exercise is to 
elucidate some of the key concepts drawn from our theoretical research framework (Figure 1) and to illustrate the 
value of institutional theory to our understanding of large-scale IT implementations initiated from governmental, 
institutional and individual calls for legal and regulatory change. 
 
The Institutionalization of the compliance Function 
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Institutionalization is described as both a property variable and a process (Scott 2008). On one hand, an institution is 
perceived as an entity with a cultural or social system characterised by a single or multiple set of features or 
properties. Alternatively, institutionalization is a process observed over time. Institutionalists’ have therefore 
observed the growth or decline of regulative (Jepperson and Meyer 1991; Tolbert and Zucker 1983), normative 
(DiMaggio 1991), and cultural-cognitive norms (Zucker 1987), and their varying influences on providing meaning 
and stability to social behaviour (Zucker 1977). Opinions vary according to the degree of rational choice exercised 
by actors in designing institutional arrangements (Meyer 1983). Some emphasise the role of actors in pursuing their 
individual interests, having carefully evaluated all the options, while others focus more on the constraints on 
individual freedom and choice to pursue their goals. Within the compliance function, societal factors, the 
organizational field, groups and individuals all played a part in influencing institutional effects and processes, 
although their specific strengths and weaknesses of varied over time.  
 
As a highly regulated sector, firms were constantly challenged by the changes in the industry through increased 
global competition, the regulatory requirements and technological imperatives, such as the need to keep pace with IT 
to satisfy government, institutional and individual investors. The automation of compliance has evolved over the past 
twenty years. The replacement of calculators with T+1 software systems that maintained electronic connections with 
other internal systems was initially slow. But as adoption increased, investor awareness about the importance of 
compliance increased. Across the four client sites, enhanced awareness about compliance issues was a mixed 
blessing. Although investment management firms realised the benefits of automating the compliance process, 
increased automation would change many of the institutionalized practices within the industry. For example, prior to 
the IMS implementation, fund managers could instruct traders to buy or sell a stock without properly evaluating the 
conditions (if any) set out by the client. A trader may therefore purchase stock in an industry (i.e. tobacco) even 
though the client may not wish to hold stock in this sector. Whether the error was deliberate or genuine, the example 
reflects a less formalised governance structure, which was institutionalized within the investment management 
industry prior to compliance automation. The IMS project manager at C.2, reflected on the changes in the industry, 
 
“Although technology has always been part of this industry, a lot of the business has been done through 
face-to-face meetings. But the scandals of Barings Bank, and more recently, Worldcom and Enron, have 
put compliance at the top of the management agenda. The IMS implementation will certainly improve our 
compliance processes, but it will also increase our responsibility and accountability to some extent. Some 
fund managers and traders have criticised the system because they think it forces them to change the way 
they do things…and nobody likes to change what they are used to”. 
 
Across all client sites, informants talked about the ‘need for change’ arising from past corporate scandals and the 
intensity of global competition within the industry. As a leading financial services center, London was seen as highly 
successful with excellent institutions and highly competent people. Yet the advent of Internet-enabled software 
infrastructure and applications meant that trading, particularly in hedge funds, had almost become a round-the-clock 
activity. Technological innovation played a leading part in transforming existing cultural practices within the 
industry.   
 
An organizational field is refers to, ‘those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of 
institutional life; key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies and other organizations that 
product similar services or products’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p. 153). Organizational fields are often treated as 
independent variables, as a collection of contextual factors or conditions affecting organization structures or 
processes.  Rather than perceiving an organizational field as a random collection of resources and schemas, or 
constructs defined by disembodied dimensions like complexity and munificence, they are instead highly organized 
(Scott 2008). Organizational fields are bounded by the presence of a common regulatory system or shared normative 
or cultural-cognitive frameworks that comprise a recognised area of institutional life. Further, the notion of field 
connotes the existence of a community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system where actors 
interact more ‘frequently and fatefully’ with one another than with actors outside of the field (Scott 1994, p.207). An 
example of an organizational field is the IS user community comprising a range of IS functions or departments (e.g. 
focal population) and related organizations, such as membership organizations (Swanson and Ramiller 1997). Social 
institutions, organizational fields and organizations may be viewed as governance structures. While governments 
exercise authority over organizations (Lindblom 1977), organizations further impose governance structures over 
individuals. Governance structures therefore encompass all those arrangements by which field-level power and 
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authority are exercised including formal and informal systems, public and private organizations, regulative, 
normative and cultural mechanisms (Scott 2008).  
 
The investment management industry is an organizational field comprising large and small firms, membership 
organizations, government agencies and other related bodies. Like the financial services industry more generally, 
investment management embodies institutional processes in various stages of institutionalization and de-
institutionalization. Observing institutional processes throughout the duration of the IMS implementation suggested 
that individual organizations perceive governmental legal and regulatory pressure from their own ‘distinctive history, 
the people who have been in it, the groups it embodies and the vested interests they have created, and the way it has 
adapted to its environment’ (Selznick 1949, p.256). The mandatory rules governing compliance invariably produced 
a disruptive influence on existing institutionalized processes. For example, the SOX act applied extensive pressures 
on firms to demonstrate not only that they possessed business processes for auditing and reporting, but also that such 
processes were robust and reliable. The imposition of SOX, coupled with institutional and individual demands for 
regulatory changes in the investment management industry suggested that compliance had become an 
institutionalized process within this organizational field.  Compliance was not simply a technical requirement at the 
client sites, but was a normative and cultural imperative. It had become inextricably linked with effective governance 
structures and best practice. In recent years, the institutionalization of the compliance function can be viewed 
alongside Selzick’s famous quote, since it had become infused ‘with value beyond the technical requirements of the 
task at hand’ (Selznick 1949, p.257). A compliance expert as C.4, claimed, 
 
“We recently won £200 million new business because we had introduced the IMS. Our clients, 
particularly the large institutional investors, are very savvy about IT systems. They are investing millions 
of dollars in pension funds so they don’t want to see another corporate financial scandal. So yes, my role 
as a compliance manager is a very important part of winning new business”. 
 
An important observation by institutional theorists is that organizations operating within the same environment 
become similar over time. This is known as isomorphism (Hawley 1968). The concept of institutional isomorphism 
was extended by Dimaggio and Powell (1983) into coercive, normative and mimetic mechanisms that, ‘make 
organizations more similar without necessarily making them more efficient’ (p. 135). They observed that the models 
and mechanisms including isomorphism among structural features are strongest within delimited organizational 
fields rather than at more diffuse societal levels. Within contemporary organizations, two observations are apparent. 
First, there is a similarity in the structural features of organizational forms within the same organizational field. For 
example, a large corporate IS department may resemble another one. Second, organizations seek to develop 
structural features that enable them to conform to regulative and normative requirements. For example, large 
corporations are keen to demonstrate their conformity with the SOX, to show they possess effective corporate 
governance policies, procedures and practices. So despite issues of productive or technical efficiency, organizations, 
which exist in highly elaborated institutional environments that are isomorphic, are more likely to acquire the 
legitimacy and resources needed to survive. Such conformance explains why regulatory and normative pressures 
result in similarities among organizations. Yet organizational structure comprises both formal and informal features. 
Whereas the former may reflect, for example, regulatory and normative pressures imposed by government; the latter 
encapsulates unregulated and, sometimes, disruptive behaviour within the workplace. A tension therefore exists 
between formal and informal structures (Scott 2008), and disentangling the two remains a empirically difficult to 
verify.  
 
The implementation of the IMS was a response to the growing need to enhance governance structures to comply with 
mandatory requirements to improve monitoring and reporting of business and trading activities. The investment 
management industry has a long history of introducing technical change, both as a consequence of compliance 
regulations and as a means of enhancing competition against rival firms. Across the four client sites, compliance 
automation was perceived as a major factor influencing the growth and direction of the financial services industry. 
Yet while the regulatory requirements applied to investment management firms in general, the normative and 
cultural-cognitive values varied among firms. In the larger firms (C.1 and C.2), institutionalized structures and 
practices tended to restrict individual actors from pursuing their goals and interests. The larger firms possessed multi-
layered, administrative structures, where decisions on IT implementation had to be authorized by many stakeholders. 
In the case of C.1, or example, formalised project management procedures, as part of the IT governance structure, 
served to restrict IT professionals in managing the IMS implementation. One project manager said, 
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“I keep telling senior managers that we need to hire more staff to enable us to complete this phase of the 
implementation cycle. But all they can see is that I must stick to the budget.  The result is that the project 
will continue to slip. But I don’t think this really matters to them, as they are more interested in keeping to 
the budget, even though the overall implementation will fall behind.” 
 
Institutionalized procedures and practices were less apparent at the hedge fund firms. For example, C.3, which had 
no IT department, had a less formalised IT governance structure, with only two individuals checking compliance 
rules on a monthly basis. This firm had outsourced all its IT to third party vendors. The IMS was purchased to 
comply with regulatory requirements, yet the lack of dedicated IT staff to introduce IT-enabled change suggested 
poor judgement on the part of senior managers. The IT consultant in charge of the implementation commented, 
 
“The guy that owns this firm doesn’t even acknowledge me – he seems to think that technology matters 
are beneath him.  Throughout the implementation, I told him that he needed to invest in better hardware 
or the database would become full and this would result in downtime. Six months later, he called my firm 
(the suppler) to complain why he couldn’t run the compliance system…the database was full! They should 
realise that IT is critical to their business and not something they can do on the cheap”. 
 
This contrasted widely with firm C.4. Here the CEO took an active part in championing the IMS implementation. IT 
at this firm was considered mission-critical. As the CEO explained, 
 
“As the needs of our clients grow more complex and the demand for information increases, we are 
continually using IT to enhance our products and services. The IMS enables us to offer a value-added risk 
management service to our clients. I think we are further ahead in the game than some of our competitors, 
particularly the larger firms which tend to be slow off the mark when it comes to IT”. 
 
Despite the criticality of IT in the investment management industry, the IT compliance function varied. 
Institutionalized methods and procedures for governing IT projects tended to be more fully articulated and practiced 
in the large investment management firms. Conversely, in the smaller firms, the value placed upon IT by senior 
executives was more significant in shaping the overall IT governance structure, whether this was well-articulated or 
poorly defined. Social action was not context-free, but was also constrained, the outcomes therefore being shaped by 
the setting in which they occur. Regulatory and normative pressures suggested that institutional isomorphism would 
increase, as the four client sites formalized their compliance processes using the IMS as a means of monitoring and 
controlling trading activities. Despite the less formalised governance structures within firms C.3 and C.4, pressure to 
conform to mandatory regulations using the state-of-the-art compliance automation would inevitably reduce 
opportunities for individual autonomy, and increase bureaucratic controls to emulate the larger investment 
management firms. Equally, firms C.1 and C.2 would also have to change existing processes as a consequence of 
compliance legislation. 
 
While much of the prior work by institutional theorists has viewed institutionalism as a source of stability and order, 
recent work has considered how institutions undergo change (Greenwood et al. 2008). Within the IS field, 
researchers have examined management of change by observing the impact or implementation of innovation and 
change programmes such as total quality management, business process reengineering, and more recently, 
knowledge management and e-business. Much of this work has looked at the development of new initiatives and 
their implementation across organizations. While institutionalists are keen to observe institutional construction and 
convergent changes processes, it is also important to recognise that institutions that exert specific effects are also 
subject to change. 
 
While there are few empirical studies on the processes of de-institutionalization (Oliver 1992), our study recognized 
that institutionalized processes were likely to change through regulative, normative and cultural pressures. Research 
across the four client sites suggested a tension between existing institutionalized processes and efforts to change 
them (de-institutionalization) by revising governance structures, laws and sanctions. Technology was a major player 
in the change process, although embedding rules and regulations within an information system served to remove 
some of the accountability and responsibility from individuals. As the IMS implementation manager pointed out, 
 
“The compliance system is introduced to stop human error. But some fund managers complained recently 
that the ‘buy’ and ‘sell’ buttons were too close together, and they could easily therefore press the wrong 
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one. There was also an incident recently where a fund manager keyed in to purchase some shares and 
then an hour later decided to buy more of the same share. When the transaction was sent to the 
accounting department, the system had only sent the second request. This was because the fund manager 
had not sent the first request to accounts. The fund manager then blamed the system, but the mistake was 
in fact his….Computers are very logical and cannot predict what you are thinking!” 
 
Despite potential criticisms of the IMS, senior executives recognised the need to use technology as an integral part of 
their IT governance structure. The IMS would create a single integrative platform for handling investment funds. 
Some traders resisted attempts to de-institutionalize existing processes. As one Project Manager (C.1) explained, 
 
“We have about 400 large institutional accounts (i.e. pension funds) and about 10,000 individual 
accounts (i.e. PEPs/ISAs). The IMS will be used for all of them, although there is only an 80% fit with our 
current business processes. People therefore have to change how they do things. They are reluctant to 
change, but forced to do so because of regulation and rules.” 
 
Pressure to de-institutionalize specific institutionalized practices had led to managerial conflict in some cases. In C.1, 
a senior manager responsible for several large client accounts was dismissed as the IMS exposed various incidents 
where compliance rules had been broken. A senior executive explained, 
 
“Prior to the compliance system (IMS) being installed, senior managers had much more freedom to 
execute decisions about buying and selling stock. We recently had to dismiss one of our senior managers 
because he had broken several rules and this led to us compensating the client. Over time, people will just 
have to get used to the fact that their decisions are being recorded, monitored and scrutinised. This will 
lead to further changes in the culture of investment banking”  
 
Our data from the four client sites showed that the implementation of the IMS was differentiated by factors including 
the size of the firm, the management and administrative structure, the project management methods and techniques 
and senior management attitudes towards IT (see Table 3). Larger firms (C.1. and C.2) had adopted standard project 
management methods and techniques, which they saw as critical for managing large-scale IT projects. The smaller 
firms adopted a less formal attitude to IT, with C.3 outsourcing all its IT function. In the pre-SOX environment, prior 
to the IMS implementation, firms C.1. and C.2 saw compliance technology as a necessary part of their IT 
expenditure. But as the SOX legislation was introduced senior executives increasingly discussed compliance as a 
priority. This was partly to demonstrate that new compliance regulations were being met, and also to avoid costly 
human errors on the trading floor. In the post-SOX environment, all firms recognized that individual and institutional 
investors perceived compliance as a major element in their selection of IMS vendors. The IMS enabled firms to 
monitor and control individual performance, and this had led to dismissal in some cases, as traders had been found to 
be negligent. One identifiable change in working practices was that traders were obliged to comply with the rules 
embedded into the IMS. This had led to a reduction in their autonomy and freedom to execute trades, which 
sometimes caused resentment among staff. A by-product of introducing the IMS was that some traders absolved 
themselves from responsibility if compliance rules were broken, occasionally blaming the technology as the cause of 
the problem. A common theme running through the interviews at all the client sites was that compliance technology 
was leading to a ‘surveillance culture’ as the capture, storage and auditing of trading data was much more 
sophisticated than in the past. This was fuelled by changing institutional logics that encouraged adoption and 
diffusion of IT to closely scrutinize firm and individual performance, thereby replacing past logics which valued 
individual freedom and autonomy. All firms had appointed additional compliance officers to observe trader 
performance, which had created a ‘them’ and ‘us’ culture. Working practices were becoming deinstitutionalized as 
staff experienced the erosion of less formal and autonomous conditions. 
 
 
 
  
Table 3. The Emerging Role of the Compliance Function in the Pre and Post IMS Implementation 
 C.1. C.2. C.3. C.4. 
Phase 1 Pre-IMS Implementation 
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- Pre-SOX 
- Managers and Traders 
operate in less formalised 
governance structure 
- Traders performance 
seen as a team effort 
- IT project management 
methods increase 
bureaucracy and 
reporting 
- Pre-SOX  
- Managers and 
Traders operate in less 
formalised governance 
structure 
- New regulatory 
pressure to improve 
financial performance 
and accountability  
 
- Post-SOX 
- Senior executives 
perceive IT as support 
function. Large-scale 
IT outsourcing 
- Distinction between 
the Business and 
Technology 
- No formal 
governance structure 
- Post-SOX 
- Senior executives 
look to distinguish firm 
from larger rivals 
- Flat management 
structure and informal 
decision-making 
structure 
- Senior executive 
support for IT 
Phase 2 Post-IMS Implementation (1) 
 - Post-SOX  
- Demands of SOX 
increase costs 
- Individual assessment 
of Trader performance 
based upon audit trail 
results from IMS 
- IMS enhances 
management control 
- Some staff resistance to 
changing working 
practices 
- Concerns that SOX 
becomes another ‘box 
ticking’ activity 
- Post-SOX  
- Demands of SOX 
increase costs  
- Higher levels of 
formalisation in 
governance structure 
- Complying with SOX 
forces managers to 
‘take their eye off the 
ball’ with their 
corporate clients 
- Compliance 
technology critical for 
improving the image 
of the financial 
services industry 
- The IMS reduces 
freedom and autonomy 
of traders and fuels a 
perception of increased 
surveillance 
- Senior executives 
place additional 
responsibility on IMS 
vendor 
- IMS imposes new 
compliance controls on 
fund managers and 
traders 
- IMS perceived to 
enhance firm 
reputation as dynamic, 
agile, with robust 
compliance technology 
- Customer 
requirement for IMS 
- IMS vendor involved 
in correcting trading 
errors 
Phase 3 Post-IMS Implementation (2) 
 - IT project manager 
voices concerns about 
vendor ‘lock-in’ with 
IMS 
- Senior Management are 
concerned about cost-
control as compliance 
function expands 
- Regulatory measures 
impose greater 
demands on 
compliance function 
- Senior managers fear 
‘loss of autonomy’ 
with IMS 
- Concerns that vendor 
remains in control of 
business and IT 
functionality of IMS 
- IMS used as ‘selling 
device’ to win new 
business 
- Realization that 
clients demand 
evidence of effective 
governance/compliance 
- Technical glitches 
seen as vendor 
responsibility only 
Phase 4 Post-IMS Implementation (3) 
 - IMS system changes 
working practices and 
reduces human 
involvement 
- IMS increases ‘data 
transparency’ 
 
- Compliance high on 
senior management 
agenda as financial 
services realise the 
costs of e-crime and 
fraud 
 
- Recognition that 
without IMS, serious 
trading errors could 
occur 
- Cost of compliance 
increases 
 
- Compliance seen as 
part of process 
improvement 
- IMS seen as ‘best in 
class’ technology 
Phase 5 Post-IMS Implementation (4) 
 - role of Compliance 
Officer becomes integral 
to corporate governance 
- Fears that compliance 
has become ‘New cost 
pit’ 
- New Compliance Rules 
imposed 
- Compliance staff 
increase 
- Managers quantify the 
‘high cost of regulatory 
compliance’ 
- Need for better 
systems integration 
between compliance 
and governance 
systems 
- Managers aware of 
‘power of supplier’ in 
developing IMS 
- IMS is part of total IT 
outsourcing strategy 
- IMS becomes one of 
the top IT systems in 
compliance 
 
- Governance and 
compliance linked with 
reputation of firm 
- IMS imposes 
uniformity of trading 
practices 
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At a more macro level of analysis, our empirical research suggests that societal pressures including the legal and 
regulatory requirements of SOX played a large part in changing governance practices and practices. For example, the 
smaller firms (C.3 and C.4) were keen to demonstrate to clients that conformance with regulatory pressures 
demonstrated ‘best practice’. All firms claimed that non-conformance with regulatory pressures was an indication of 
poor management practice and ‘deviant’ behaviour. Overseas competitors were often described as, not having the 
same standards’ as North American or European financial institutions. Prior work suggests the threat and magnitude 
of government sanctions for failing to comply with mandatory change acts as a catalyst for organizations to abandon 
existing practices and procedures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Oliver 1992).  Within investment management, the 
high profile financial disasters of World.com and Enron had created a perceived crisis in corporate governance. This, 
in turn, engendered rapidly devised legislation, which was imposed across the investment management industry and 
beyond. Politically based societal pressures of this kind amounted to powerful inducements on the industry to devise 
best practice policies and procedures to comply with these changes. Coupled with this, economic imperatives such as 
changes in global competition and increased outsourcing further exerted pressures for deinstitutionalization. The 
developing financial markets of Asia were exerting new economic pressures on investment management firms to 
look for economies of scale, with offshore outsourcing as one option. Social pressures about the conduct and 
behavior of corporate executives further emerged at the societal level, as topics such as corporate and social 
responsibility were increasingly discussed in the media. Technological change was also a key factor, as it was 
inextricably linked with culturally-embedded notions of progress and prosperity. Improvements in the functionality 
of compliance automation had fuelled global pressures to adopt state-of-the-art technology as an indicator of good 
governance and best practice.  
 
Our findings suggest that the construction, maintenance and diffusion of institutions, like the development of 
compliance automation, occurred over an extended period. Yet a major shock to the industry in the form of large-
scale financial scandals, acted as a catalyst for government and other regulatory bodies to impose stringent new rules 
to tighten up governance structures. Institutional boundaries and logics underpinning governance were not confined 
to the organizational field, but was influenced and shaped at the societal level. In contrast, organizational and 
individual scope for defining governance procedures and practices was further limited, as regulatory and normative 
pressures leading to isomorphism, were eroded by new pressures to conform to changing government regulations. 
But while our data identifies institutional isomorphic characteristics attributed to coercive, normative and mimetic 
mechanisms (Dimaggio and Powell 1983), we concur that empirical measures pertaining to each one are difficult to 
isolate (Mizruchi and Fein 1999) and this remains a challenge for institutional theory. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This research has focused upon the introduction of an IMS in the compliance function of four financial services 
firms. Our interest was to observe how institutionalized processes undergo institutional change over time by societal, 
organizational and individual pressures. Developing a conceptual framework using various contributions from 
institutional theory, our case-based research shows that regulative bodies in the form of government agencies and 
professional organizations imposed stringent rules to improve corporate and IT governance. These pressures were 
technologically enabled through the implementation of an IMS to closely monitor and control pre- and post-trade 
compliance activities. Yet the process of institutionalization of the compliance function followed a non-linear path, 
as firms within the organizational field introduced policies and practices on an ad-hoc basis. Our findings reinforce 
prior work which suggests that, among various external pressures, government regulations are highly influential in 
de-institutionalizing past practices, as a result of the level of coercion that underpins the legal enforcement of 
government mandates (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
 
Such coercive forces were also found to be important in shaping the IT compliance function, as the failure to comply 
with legal and regulatory change would result in punitive sanctions for firms. These sanctions were directed at firms 
and individuals, through heavy fines and dismissal of staff. As client sites embraced these changes, past informal 
working practices were being eroded and de-legitimized, as organizational members began to conform to new rules, 
procedures and practices. The IMS played a significant part in creating institutional isomorphism as firms were keen 
to demonstrate to potential clients that investment in compliance automation demonstrated effective IT governance. 
Such conformance helped to explain how and why regulatory and normative pressures result in similarities among 
investment management firms and institutional isomorphism across an organizational field (Scott 2008). Our 
research suggests that compliance had become an institutionalized activity at the four firms. It was not merely a 
technical requirement, but had become imbued with cultural and normative values. Investment management firms 
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were keen to demonstrate that conformance extended to all individuals, including senior executives. Past working 
practices that were part of the ‘informal’ organization were being replaced with technology-enabled practices, and 
there was some evidence to suggest that managers and staff resisted the more formalised working environment.  
 
This paper makes a contribution to institutional theory by examining some of the antecedents that relate to 
institutional conformity and change in the compliance function. It further enhances our understanding of IT-enabled 
change within the organizational field of the investment management industry. Rather than focusing upon individual 
case-based examples, our discussion has pointed to wider societal influences that exert pressures upon organizations 
to undergo change. In this regard, the introduction of compliance automation is set within the wider context of 
examining individual strategic choice, but one that recognises that governmental influences play a key role in how 
organizations adopt and diffuse technology. This research contributes to existing studies that examine the broader 
social and cultural implications of technology change (Barrett and Walsham 1999; Currie 2004; Swanson and 
Ramiller 1997).  
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